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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses current controversy over ethical practices in the Human Terrain 
System. In the past decade the Department of Defense has adopted a cultural approach in the 
science of military control consequently creating the controversial HTS program. The HTS 
employs anthropologists to create ethnographic data sets on target populations, which has created 
ethical concerns for the anthropology discipline. This phenomenon is situated in the context of 
anthropologists’ roles in colonial population control, prior military engagements, and the 
discipline’s reactions to late 20th century ethics issues. This ethical dilemma is analyzed using 
discourse of the military, academics, and the public. Themes found are contextualized in an 
analysis of ethics standards and practices for anthropology and the military and the AAAs 
opposition to the HTS. Findings are explained through application of Hoffman’s cultural 
response to disaster model. Based on this research, I make some initial suggestions for resolving 
this ethical dilemma. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my utmost gratitude to a number of people. There have been a 
variety of individuals who have helped me in one way or another along this journey. I write this 
to thank those of you who have shared in my happiness, setbacks, and successes throughout this 
thesis process. Namely I would like to thank my parents, Keith and Laurel Clawson. I attribute 
many of my successes to your endless examples of tireless work ethic, what it means to prosper 
through trials and tribulations, and why it is important to be both selfless and valiant in the face 
of difficulty.  
I also want to thank my siblings: Crystal, Kaela, Bridget, and Tom, all of which are 
always a phone call or glass of wine away. One way or another, each of you have attributed to 
my personal and professional growth my entire life. Each of you have always led by example 
and truly shown what grit is and for that I am indebted. I want to express my thanks to Jared 
Huibregtse who came into my life at just the right time. It thrills me that we were able to 
experience and conquer the last year of our theses process together. Last, but certainly not least, I 
want to thank my friends, fellow graduate students who have become friends, and a variety of 
faculty and staff in the NDSU Anthropology Department who have helped inspire and motivate 
me in a variety of ways throughout this program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
DEDICATION 
This thesis is dedicated to the professionals willing to engage in discourse surrounding shunned 
controversy and then advocate for change. This thesis is also dedicated to the millions of people, 
both civilian and military, who have been and will be affected both positively and negatively by 
the work of social scientists and the military throughout history and in the future. May the 
deaths, knowledge, struggles, and successes endured not be in vain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iv 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... x 
 
CHAPTER 1. AN ETHICAL QUANDARY IN AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY: AN 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
The Human Terrain System and Anthropology: An Introduction to the Conflict .............. 1 
Framing the Thesis Questions ............................................................................................. 5 
Outline of the Thesis ........................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER 2. SOURCES AND ANALYSIS METHODS............................................................. 8 
Framing Sources: Ethics vs. Morals and “Studying Up” .................................................... 8 
Sources .............................................................................................................................. 10 
Methods: Discourse Analysis ........................................................................................... 15 
Analysis by Coding and Theming......................................................................... 16 
Thematic Findings ................................................................................................ 17 
Applying Results ................................................................................................... 19 
CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORICAL PAST AND ITS ENDURING CONTROVERSIES ............ 21 
Social Sciences, Politics, and the Military ........................................................................ 21 
Late Colonial Past ................................................................................................. 21 
Early 20th Century Backlash ................................................................................. 23 
Late 20th Century: Darkness in El Dorado and its Significance to Framing the 
HTS ....................................................................................................................... 24 
 vii 
 
The Emergence of the HTS............................................................................................... 28 
HTS and COIN Tactics in the Middle East .......................................................... 33 
CHAPTER 4. ETHICS: STANDARDS AND PRACTICE ......................................................... 40 
Ethics in Anthropology ..................................................................................................... 40 
Ethics in the HTS .............................................................................................................. 43 
Anthropology’s Position on the HTS ................................................................................ 46 
The Conflict: Uncertainty ................................................................................................. 50 
CHAPTER 5. HTS AS A DISASTER: USING HOFFMAN’S MODEL .................................... 52 
The Crisis Phase: Uncertainty and Vulnerability.............................................................. 53 
Uncertainty ............................................................................................................ 54 
Vulnerability ......................................................................................................... 56 
The Aftermath Nexus: Social Control .............................................................................. 58 
The Passage to Closure: More Uncertainty ...................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER 6. HTS NOW, HTS IN THE FUTURE: A CONCLUSION ..................................... 63 
 
Conclusive Overview ........................................................................................................ 63 
The Future of Debates and the HTS ................................................................................. 66 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 70 
APPENDIX A. RESEARCH AND EXPERTISE OF ANTHROPOLOGISTS AT AAA 
CONFERENCE 2013, ORIGINAL IMAGE ................................................................................ 87 
 
APPENDIX B. SOURCE MATERIALS FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ................................. 88 
APPENDIX C. RESEARCH PLAN: STRIKE HIT, HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM  
HANDBOOK (2008) .................................................................................................................... 91 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Categories and Media Types ..................................................................................................... 14 
2. All Themes/Frequencies ........................................................................................................... 18 
3. Main and Secondary Themes/Frequencies ............................................................................... 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. Number of civilian casualties in the War on Terror ................................................................... 2 
2. On-site research areas and expertise of anthropologists present at the 2013 AAA annual 
conference noted with red circles. Graphic design courtesy of Sophie Haren. (See Appendix 
A for the original source for the graphic.) .................................................................................... 11 
 
3. Timeline: List of Significant Events: HTS (Forte 2010b) ........................................................ 29 
4. Screenshot of HTS recruitment email (Crockford 2012) .......................................................... 32 
5. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 1 of 3) .......................................... 34 
6. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 2 of 3) .......................................... 35 
7. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 3 of 3) .......................................... 36 
8. Conceptual model based on Hoffman (1999) ........................................................................... 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
32 CFR 219  ................................................ Code of Federal Regulations - Dept. of Defense:            
                                                                      Protection of Human Subjects  
45 CFR 46  .................................................. Code of Federal Regulations – Dept. of Heath and  
                                                                      Human Services: Protection of Human Subjects  
 
AAA  ........................................................... American Anthropological Association  
AO ............................................................... Area of Operation 
 
CEAUSSIC  ................................................ Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology 
  with US Military and Intelligence Communities 
 
CDA  ........................................................... Critical Discourse Analysis 
CIA .............................................................. Central Intelligence Agency 
COIN ........................................................... Counterinsurgency  
DAC ............................................................ District Area Councils 
DAHR ......................................................... Declaration of Anthropology and Human Rights 
DHA ............................................................ Discourse Historical Approach 
DoD ............................................................. Department of Defense 
DoD 5500.7-R ............................................. Department of Defense Joint Ethics Regulation 
DoJ .............................................................. Department of Justice  
IED .............................................................. Improvised Explosive Device 
EDPM ......................................................... Ethical Decision-Making Plan 
FM 3-24 ...................................................... Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 
FM 100-20 .................................................. Counterinsurgency Field Manual 100-20 
FWA ............................................................ Federalwide Assurance 
HSPP ........................................................... Human Subjects Protection Program 
HTR............................................................. Human Terrain 
 xi 
 
HTS ............................................................. Human Terrain System 
HTT ............................................................. Human Terrain Team 
HTTHB ....................................................... Human Terrain Team Handbook 
IDPs............................................................. Internally Displaced Persons 
IRB .............................................................. Institutional Review Board 
JER .............................................................. Joint Ethics Regulation, DoD 5500.7-R 
JIEDDO.......................................................Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat        
Organization 
 
NAC ............................................................ Neighborhood Area Councils 
NCA ............................................................ Network for Concern Anthropologists 
NGO ............................................................ Non-Governmental Organizations 
OE ............................................................... Operational Environment  
RPSH........................................................... Research Plan: STRIKE HTT 
TRADOC .................................................... United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
UCMJ .......................................................... Uniform Code of Military Justice 
UDHR ......................................................... Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN ............................................................... United Nations 
USDA .......................................................... United States Department of Agriculture 
USNWC ...................................................... United States Naval War College 
WWI ............................................................ World War I 
WWII .......................................................... World War II 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1. AN ETHICAL QUANDARY IN AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY: 
AN INTRODUCTION  
The Human Terrain System and Anthropology: An Introduction to the Conflict 
This thesis is an analysis and evaluation of conflicts and debates between anthropologists 
and the military focused on the ethics of human subjects research and the ethical uses of data 
collected through social scientists contracted by the military. For many decades, US military 
operations and national security and intelligence agencies have utilized social scientists to gain 
sociocultural information on indigenous populations in order to assist in military decision-
making. This practice is an extension of 19th and early 20th century colonial era government, 
military, civilian uses of social research to learn about, control, and exploit colonized and/or 
civilian populations. In contemporary practice, such research takes numerous forms, from 
psychologists having “been involved in designing torture since at least the Vietnam War” (Gray 
and Zelinski 2006:128) to the creation of the Human Terrain System (HTS) by the US Army 
reduce collateral damage, particularly civilian deaths, and engender other, more positive 
outcomes for local populations.  
The HTS is a contract-based program whereby the Army embeds social scientists, 
including anthropologists, with troops in areas of conflict in order to gather sociocultural 
information on indigenous populations. The aim of HTS is to gather local sociocultural 
knowledge from indigenous populations to be used in decision-making for a diversity of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. HTS is founded on the premise that “all insurgencies, 
even today’s highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people” (Sewell 2007:xlv) thus 
knowledge about indigenous people is critical to COIN success. The HTS was implemented in 
2007, paralleling the so-called “surge” in Iraq when 9,000+ US troops were added to the war in 
  
the Middle East and the military began a focus on 
The program became a permanent 
Human Terrain Team (HTT) deployments
neighboring Middle Eastern countries 
Figure 1. Number of civilian casualties in the War on Terror
The late 2007-2013 period following the “surge” and the implementation of the HTS saw 
a major decline in civilian fatalities (see Figure 1)
factors, including the significant increase in troops, as well as the contribution of HTS
ethnographic data to decision-making. Yet despite this demonstrated value of anthropological 
knowledge, involvement in current mil
in such by qualified anthropologists 
three of the Directors of the HTS Social Sciences Directorate (past and present) have doctoral 
degrees in anthropology. According to King (2011:10), 
social scientists were anthropologists. A
with a master’s degree, 11 were anthropologists (four with a Ph.D., seven
While anthropologists are not alone in working with the military through HTS or other programs 
– scholars trained in other behavioral and social sciences disciplines do as well and 
2 
humanizing relations with local populations. 
US Army contract operation in 2010 and the most current 
 have been in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and other 
during the “War on Terror.”  
.  
. This decline can be attributed to a variety of 
itary operations remains so controversial that participation 
other than in leadership positions is low. For example, all 
in 2011 fewer than 10% of the 77 HTS 
mong the 32 HTS social scientists with a Ph.D. and 45 
 with a master’s). 
 
-generated 
as the 
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previous numbers indicate, more so – no other discipline has generated as much outspoken 
debate and concern over working relationships with the military as anthropology has.  
The creation and implementation of the HTS, and specifically the “recruitment of 
anthropologists to provide ‘cultural knowledge’ for the purpose of more effective 
counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan” has created numerous conflicts and debates between 
HTS advocates and anthropological critics (Forte 2011:149). Some professional academics find 
that a practicing anthropologist’s involvement in the HTS or in other work for military or 
government intelligence is a violation of ethics codes as provided by anthropology’s primary 
professional organization, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) (see Forte 2011, 
González 2009, Gusterson 200, Price 2008, 2011). The AAA’s Statement on Ethics specifically 
states that “a primary ethical obligation shared by anthropologists is to do no harm” and that the 
protection of ethnographic participants from physical, social, and psychological harm is critical 
(2012, emphases added). 
The AAA also states that “among our goals are the dissemination of anthropological 
knowledge and its use to solve human problems” (2012). Given that the aim of HTS is to use 
local sociocultural knowledge for better operational decision-making and minimizing collateral 
damage, particularly indigenous civilian deaths, it would seem that the involvement of social 
scientists such as anthropologists in HTS meets AAA goals, the needs of national security, and 
reducing casualties. And indigenous populations are not the only group to benefit from HTS 
research. Soldier safety increases greatly if they are taught about the local culture and how to 
interact respectfully, effectively, and cooperatively with locals. Without input from those well-
trained in ethnographic research, bystander populations may continue to be exploited or harmed, 
intentionally or otherwise, by the US military. Military personnel may unknowingly participate 
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in harmful or dangerous practices due to a lack of culture-specific knowledge or to avoidable 
cross-cultural misunderstanding. 
However, “weaponizing culture” through the HTS is not supported by the AAA and is 
opposed by many anthropologists. Hugh Gusterson has forcefully argued that “the ‘war on 
terror’ has disturbed [our] settled norms, [and] that anthropologists should not assist 
counterinsurgency campaigns” (2007:155). Yet for anthropology to completely opt out of any 
engagement with the military is not a valid solution since war and other sociopolitical conflicts 
will continue, bringing with them ongoing potentials for harm to civilians and soldiers alike. If 
anthropology as an entity were to step out, a vacuum is created whereby other disciplines can 
dominate the military intelligence realm and pick up where anthropology left off, but perhaps in 
a less rigorously trained fashion in terms of ethnographic methods and cultural sensitivity. And if 
anthropologists do not cultivate a working relationship with the military, what will stop them 
from creating their own “anthropologists” instead? What will this do for reducing harm? 
Harm, in all forms, is both a violation of AAA professional ethics and basic human 
rights. According to Article 3 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), “everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (United Nations N.d.:1). Rights as laid out by 
the United Nations (UN), of which the US is a member, and human rights criteria closely 
followed by the AAA (as guided by “UDHR, the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights, and on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, the Conventions on Torture, Genocide, 
and Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and other treaties which bring 
basic human rights within the parameters of international written and customary law and 
practice”) are being violated by a HTS that is currently not bound to or capable of protecting its 
human subjects to the fullest capacity (AAA DAHR 1999). Yet as Michael Carrithers suggests, 
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the UDHR “amounts merely to a time and culture bound artefact, an expressions only of some 
people’s ideas at a particular time” (2005:435) and similarly, the AAA’s DAHR has not been 
updated for well over a decade.1  
As a profession, anthropology should to find a means through which it can use its 
knowledge to speak to issues of harm, international human rights, and the HTS. Addressing this 
in updates to the AAA’s DAHR is one possible step in this process but one that would be mostly 
symbolic. The findings in this thesis suggest that a more substantial first step is for anthropology 
to work with the military to make human subjects protections policies, protocols, and practices in 
the HTS more transparent and accountable, reflecting the same ethical practice accountability 
that academic anthropologists are bound to through their institutions’ Human Subjects 
Protections Programs (HSPPs) and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). As it stands, a key 
concern is that data that is collected by social scientists in the HTS are not controlled by them or 
subject to transparent human subjects protection assurances and could thus be used for military 
decision-making that harms the populations involved. The rationale for this thesis is thus the 
need to move towards a reformed, ethically accountable HTS that can provide legally-
enforceable protection to all inhabitants of war zones (i.e. civilians, soldiers, HTS operatives and 
other contracted employees, etc.) to prevent harm. 
Framing the Thesis Questions  
In manners not dissimilar to those in the past (see chapter 3), anthropologists began 
working for the military and other government agencies during the War on Terror and work by 
those scholars quickly engendered concern in the larger community of anthropologists in the US. 
Anthropologist Felix Moos (1995, 2004) assisted former Director of the Central Intelligence 
                                                 
1
 This was a concern I brought up at the AAA 2013 meeting at the AAA Committee for Human Rights Public 
Forum. The committee members agreed and created a spot for discussion in their annual meeting for the next day. 
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Agency, General Petraeus, in military intelligence decision-making, initiating the vocal 
disapproval of many in the AAA, Network for Concerned Anthropologists (NCA), and the 
academic and professional anthropological community in general. Montgomery McFate 
(Anthropology PhD from Yale University, Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School, now the 
Minerva Chair at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War College) was the leading 
and most influential anthropologist in the development of the HTS program.  
McFate and Andrea Jackson’s 2005 pilot-program paper proposing the HTS for US Army 
COIN operations, An Organizational Solution for DOD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs, marks the 
beginning of critical discourse against the HTS by anthropologists. Groups such as the AAA 
(2007), NCA (N.d.b), and anthropologists such as Forte (2007, 2008, 2010a, 2011, 2013) as well 
as others already against the military co-optation of anthropology, including Roberto González 
(2004, 2007, 2009), Hugh Gusterson (2003, 2007), and David Price (2002, 2004, 2008, 2009b, 
2011), began speaking out and writing against the program as it developed, was implemented, 
and became permanent.  
In the present, questions with respect to the ethics of ethnographically collecting 
sociocultural data for military intelligence purposes endure, creating ongoing debates. Given that 
war and other sociopolitical conflicts will not disappear in the future, in this thesis I thus analyze 
the ethical dilemmas surrounding sociocultural knowledge-based COIN practices by the military 
by posing the following research questions: 
1) Are there common themes to be found in discussions regarding the HTS in the 
government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres? 
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2) Are there disparities in the ethics standards of AAA, human subjects research in 
academe, and the military? 
Outline of the Thesis 
 In this chapter I have established the basic context for the research, the rationale for the 
work, and research questions. Chapter 2 provides a discussion on sources and methodologies 
employed for the thesis. Chapters 3-4 provide an historical context on anthropology as a 
discipline, the emergence of HTS, and an analysis of ethical standards, policies, and practices for 
anthropology and the military as framed by the discourse analysis findings and the additional 
analysis of other source materials. Chapter 3 provides a concise overview of the historical 
relationships between the social sciences and the military/government and the emergence of the 
HTS. It also includes an overview of the events leading up to the implementation of General 
Petraeus’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) and HTS informed COIN tactics in the 
Middle East and the public controversy in anthropology over ethics, the Darkness in El Dorado 
investigation.  
 Chapter 4 outlines and analyzes the ethics standards, policies, and practices in 
anthropology, the military, and the HTS, concluding with the AAA position on and ethics 
concerns with the HTS. Chapter 6 provides a conclusive overview and addresses possibilities for 
future research and the future of the HTS, suggesting that a transformed and transparent program 
is the best route for the future, be it for the HTS or one of a similar fashion yet to be developed 
given that a COIN program informed by the social and behavioral sciences is inevitably and 
irrefutably here to stay.  
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CHAPTER 2. SOURCES AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
Framing Sources: Ethics vs. Morals and “Studying Up” 
 A guiding focus for this work is informed by suggestions that we consider “current 
anthropological knowledge and its moral import” as key factors when addressing the human 
world including interconnected relationships such as those in the military and academic spheres 
(Carrithers 2005:433). Didier Fassin (2008) and Carlo Caduff (2011) address anthropological 
discomfort with reflexivity about morals in their work and Fassin, in particular, notes that he is 
not trying to “defend any kind of moral obligation for anthropologists” but instead argues “for a 
moral anthropology” (2008:334). For Fassin, anthropologists should privilege a “human belief in 
the possibility of telling right from wrong and in the necessity of acting in favor of good and 
against evil” (2008:334). Fassin argues that attention to morals would indeed assist in 
understanding “the evaluative principles and practices operating” between different spheres like 
the military and anthropology as well as the “debates they arouse, the processes through which 
they become implemented, the justifications that are given to account for discrepancies observed 
between what should be and what is actually” in a system like the HTS (2008:336). Fassin goes 
on to suggest the necessity of considering anthropologists' own moral prejudices or value 
judgments “as objects of…scientific investigation as well as those of his [sic] ‘others’” (2008: 
337), with the “others” here being users of the HTS. 
According to Fassin, considering both moral and ethical reflexivity as part of research 
activity is epistemologically and politically crucial if one is to question the judgment and values 
which do indeed underlie any ethnographic research (2008:341). The theories of Fassin and 
Michael Carrithers overlap because they both suggest questioning institutional and academic 
ethical and “moral grounds” (Fassin 2008: 342) as part of research into “the understanding of 
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societies and their moralities” (Carrithers 2005:445). It would seem that adding a moral 
dimension to studying the military would be thus be productive. However, the 2012 AAA 
Statement on Ethics notes that morals are not ethics, that 
ethics and morals differ in important ways. The complex issues that anthropologists 
confront rarely admit to the simple wrongs and rights of moral dicta, and one of the prime 
ethical obligations of anthropologists is to carefully and deliberately weigh the 
consequences and ethical dimensions of the choices they make — by action or inaction.  
Navigating “core moral dimensions of anthropology as a way of paying attention to—and acting 
within—a human world” (Carrithers 2005:446) is perhaps valuable for a self-study of 
anthropologists. However, the inclusion of moral positions in arguing for a HTS program that is 
bound as an institution to protect its subjects from all possible harm and be accountable for such 
is an impossible aim. This is because morals are individual, subjective positions that inform 
personal behavior, beliefs, or character while ethics belong the realm of negotiated standards of 
behavior for a given group such as anthropologists, a company, or the military.  
Stepping away from issues of morals (and thus individual subjectivities that inform 
morals such as political beliefs) allows for a focus on ethical practice as required, or not, by the 
professions involved with the HTS. This requires a careful analysis of the multiple discourses on 
and about the relationships between the social sciences, the military, and the HTS with careful 
attention to these as institutions of power. Anthropologists such as Hortense Powdermaker 
(1966) and Laura Nader (1972) have argued for an “upward anthropology” or “studying up” 
where the ethnographic focus is on mainstream individuals and institutions who wield social 
power. Both suggest that anthropological fieldwork on those who are powerful/dominant and is 
important for anthropology to participate in critiques of a hegemonic world order (Carrithers 
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2005: 445). Studying up has been applied to the military, both in ethnographies of the military 
and scholarly critiques of military power. This investigation thus analyses past and current ethics 
issues regarding the HTS and the social scientists it employs through the investigation of a 
number of published academic works, public media, policy documents, and military doctrine 
documents. The literature used for this project as both historical context and for analysis includes 
that from researchers who have intently studied the involvement of social scientists with the US 
government/military (from both inside and outside) and anthropologists who have specifically 
studied the HTS. 
Sources 
For this thesis, materials available as physically published works or via the internet 
served as my sources given that doing on-site fieldwork on the HTS was not an option due to 
issues of finances, access, and safety. It is worth noting that current ethnographic research in 
areas affected by the War on Terror is extremely rare (and for the same reasons noted above), 
making my “research at a distance” not out of the ordinary (see Figure 2); this may change in the 
future. In recent years the HTS has taken interest in Latin America, Africa, and the Caribbean 
(Forte 2008) thus the potential growth of this program creates space, and perhaps safer places, to 
conduct fieldwork in the future. I may eventually be able to conduct fieldwork in areas where the 
HTS has operated or with persons who have been involved with HTS programs for a future 
project such as a dissertation.  
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Figure 2. On-site research areas and expertise of anthropologists present at the 2013 AAA annual 
conference noted with red circles. Graphic design courtesy of Sophie Haren. (See Appendix A 
for the original source for the graphic.) 
The selection of relevant sources for analysis began with crafting an understanding of 
what the HTS does according to directions and protocols provided for those working in and with 
the HTS. In December of 2008, Wikileaks made a complete copy of the US Army’s Human 
Terrain Team Handbook (HTTHB) available online. A complete research plan, “Research Plan: 
STRIKE HTT” (RPSH), is included in the HTTHB and this provides a concise idea of what 
types of information HTTs are expected to collect in the field (see Finney 2008:104-106 and 
Appendix A for the full outline). The RPSH is a working template for HTT members on what 
sociocultural information is desired on various aspects of the indigenous civilian population and 
in some cases, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the area of operation (AO). This 
information becomes a form of local intelligence critical to US military intelligence and 
operational decision-making as a COIN strategy. The type of information collected requires 
social sciences training and thus this is why the US military employs professional 
 12 
 
anthropologists and other social scientists for data collection. The HTTHB also contains specific 
information on best practices for HTTs, the protocols for creating a research project, statements 
on ethical practice, and reporting procedures.  
I read the HTTHB as an anthropologist “insider” (I have a bachelor’s degree in cultural 
anthropology) as well as an outsider to the military as I have not been a member of the military. 
This allowed me to think about the contents in both a subjective and objective manner. Once I 
was familiar with the HTTHB, research into the origins of the HTS program and its history into 
the present was undertaken. For needed historical context, additional information was collected 
on the US military, with an emphasis on the Army and the War on Terror given priority because 
the HTS officially began operating during this particular conflict. Further works on the roles of 
anthropology and the military in World War I (WWI), World War II (WWII), Cold War, and the 
Vietnam War were secured as were scholarly publications on the history of anthropology and 
colonial government relationships in order to understand anthropology’s long history with 
military and government intelligence. Information from these items are presented as historical 
context in Chapter 3. 
With this context in place as a frame, sources for the thesis analysis were selected. Since 
the advent of the HTS, academic and public discussion on the role of social science in the 
military has been in surplus. Discourse surrounding the HTS is thick with debate regarding 
ethical issues, often in the context of the US’ past and present wars (Price 2008). This discourse, 
found in both print and online-only works, is a form of “indirect observation data” through which 
I would be able to study “the traces of human behavior and thought…analyze archival data…and 
secondary analysis, [and] reanalyzing data that were collected for other projects” (Bernard and 
Ryan 2010:19). I thus applied methods for online/virtual ethnography that adapt “common 
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participant-observation ethnographic procedures to the unique contingencies of computer-
mediated social interaction: alteration, accessibility, anonymity, and archiving” (Kozinets 
2010:58). This methodology utilizes both “online and offline techniques” by using “ethnographic 
and netnographic approaches” (Kozinets 2010:58). This process would hopefully enable the 
creation of rich ethnography or as Geertz (1973) has called it, “thick description,” not limited to 
the Internet alone (Sade-Beck 2004:1). 
Deep searches for and through articles, blogs, AAA statements, the HTS official 
government website, social media (Facebook, Twitter, hashtag tracking), Google Scholar 
tracking, and news media facilitated the identification of a broad array works on and information 
regarding the HTS and ethics issues. Sources were selected from this large body of information 
available based on the following criteria: 1) they must concern the HTS and/or working 
relationships between the social sciences and the military and 2) they must be produced by a 
person of professional standing in the military, anthropology, or general public spheres including 
journalists, scholars, civilian employees of the military or government, and military personnel.2 
At least one third of the total material collected focused explicitly on ethical concerns with the 
HTS.  
134 significant works were located and those that dealt with ethics standards and 
practices where analyzed to provide an outline of information on standards and policies for ethics 
in anthropology the military and the AAA position on the HTS in Chapter 4. Over the course of 
many weeks, I then further narrowed these 134 works found down to 22 key items (see 
Appendix B for complete bibliographic information) specifically for a discourse analysis. As 
noted in Table 1 these selected works represented an array of media types including scholarly 
                                                 
2
 The general public includes publicly available discourse by professionals in academia or of PhD standing who do 
not identify with the military or anthropology but discuss the HTS in a public arena. 
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journal articles, journalism, blogs, and selections from books. After close review of the 22 items, 
each item was categorized into one of three text-type categories (see Table 1) based on the 
intended audience for and author affiliation of the work: Military/Government Discourse, 
Academic Discourse, Public Discourse. These 22 items became the data set for performing 
discourse analysis to identify patterns that could help in understanding concerns over the HTS, 
similarities and differences in ethics codes, and the core procedural and ethics issues that form 
the controversy over social scientists working for military operations. 
Table 1. Categories and Media Types. 
 
 
Category 
 
Source 
 
Media Type 
Military/ 
Government 
Discourse 
Connable Military journal article 
Cornell & Jackson Book, risk management 
Finney Military directives/protocol publication 
Foust Blog 
Jager Military journal article 
McFate & Fondacaro Military journal article 
Petraeus, et al. Military directives/protocol publication 
Academic 
Discourse 
AAA (x2) Professional academic organization publication 
Albro & Gusterson Military news media 
Forte Blog feature 
Glenn (x2) Academic news media 
González Academic news media 
NCA Professional academic organization publication 
Price (x2) Popular news media 
Public 
Discourse  
Gezari (a) Non-fiction book 
Gezari (b) Popular news media 
Weinberger Popular news media 
Wintersteen Blog feature 
Wynn Blog feature 
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Methods: Discourse Analysis 
There are multiple definitions for “discourse” itself so it is first it is necessary to 
understand which definitions were used in this research. Encarnacion Hidalgo Tenorio 
(2011:185) provides six different definitions of discourse, three of which I used to define 
discourse in this thesis:  
1. communication expected in one situation context 
2. human interaction through any means, verbal and non-verbal 
3. a whole communicative event  
Discourse here is thus found in physical and online publications in the form of analytical 
narratives, quotes and transcribed interviews, historical information, and newer forms of 
“information/conversation” such as blogs. 
 Due to the need to understand the context from which HTS emerged as well as the 
contexts informing concern over the HTS by anthropologists, a discourse-historical approach 
(DHA), was used to “integrate…all available background information in the analysis and 
interpretation of the many layers of written and spoken text” (Van Dijk 2011:364; see also 
Wodak and Meyer 2009). DHA creates traceable patterns in discourse over time (Van Dijk 
2011:364) and thus used to identify such in academic, military, and public discourse on the HTS.  
A critical discourse analysis (CDA) perspective was also utilized in order to identify and 
account for power dynamics present in discourse on the HTS and the power of those producing 
that discourse. Producers of this discourse include members of the military, anthropology, and 
news media, all “powerful” in society in different yet intersecting ways. A CDA perspective 
specifically allowed me to analyze discourse as it both upholds power and challenges power 
dynamics (Fairclough 2008; Foucault 1981, 1982; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002; connable 2007; 
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Van Dijk 2003; Wodak and Meyer 2009). This is because “CDA focuses on the ways discourse 
structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance 
in society” (Van Dijk 2011:353). Through analyzing the “relationship between discourse and 
power,” one finds that “power and domination are reproduced by text and talk” (Wodak and 
Meyer 2009:23) and this is particularly true in the ongoing dialog on the HTS. 
Analysis by Coding and Theming  
Preparation for discourse analysis of the sources collected followed methodologies 
proposed by Bonnie Nastasi (1999). These “approaches to selecting segments for transcription” 
and analysis included: “purposefully or randomly” selecting segments of public discourse and 
published documents, “selecting relevant segments” to “transcribe only segments…that are 
relevant to the research question,” and identify “critical incidents” (Nastasi 1999:21-22). 
Relevant excerpts from the 22 selected works were thus copied and pasted or transcribed in 
segments (2-3 sentences per segment) into an Excel workbook for organized coding. This 
resulted in 99 pages of text for coding. 
Coding was done manually in the Excel workbook and was completed in two steps. The 
first step was initial coding (see Bernard and Ryan 2010; Emerson et al. 2011; Schensul and 
LeCompte 2013; Schensul, et al. 1999). In this process I used codes to assign simple, descriptive 
labels to a phrase, sentence, or cluster of sentences. Coding highlighted consistencies, 
inconsistencies, and concerns across the military, academic, and public domains of discourse 
surrounding the HTS. The initial coding process consisted of 273 codes.  
 The next step of the coding process was sorting and creating a codebook containing two 
kinds of codes: theme codes and memos (Bernard and Ryan 2010:76). First code duplicates were 
accounted for and minimized. Next, codes were ranked according to usefulness for this project. 
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Secondary coding was then conducted to identify overarching theme codes from initial codes, 
grouping the initial codes into broader categories of similarity (“themes”). The codebook also 
contained information on where the coded discourse actually occurred in the original text. My 
memos acted as field notes about codes and contained a running commentary of ideas and 
questions as I analyzed the discourse segments (Bernard and Ryan 2010:76).  
Thematic Findings 
 Tables 2 and 3 outline the themes and frequency of themes identified through the process 
of discourse analysis. The top six themes for each of the 3 discourse categories 
(Military/Government, Academic, Public) are listed in Table 2 along with their raw and averaged 
frequencies of appearance in the codebook and the discourse source authors. Table 3 outlines the 
main themes and subthemes identified. By numerically analyzing the average frequency of 
themes, I found three dominant, main themes across categories: uncertainty, vulnerability, and 
social control. Among the remaining themes, two secondary themes emerged: coproduction of 
knowledge and data control. Uncertainty, vulnerability, and social control are thus the three 
most prominent concerns regarding the HTS across government/military, anthropology, and 
general public spheres. Issues regarding the coproduction of knowledge and data control are 
secondary concerns. A few distinctions regarding these concerns must be made. First, the 
coproduction of knowledge is a top three concern (more “main”) in military discourse but 
secondary in academic and public discourse. Second, data control is of higher concern (although 
still “secondary”) in military and academic discourse versus public discourse. Third, uncertainty 
is the top concern in academic and public discourse but is the lowest of the top 6 concerns in 
military discourse. 
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Table 2. All Themes/Frequencies. 
 
Category 
 
Coded Themes  
Raw 
Theme 
Frequency 
 
Frequency 
Average 
 
Source  
Military/ 
Government 
Discourse 
Social control 43 7.2 Connable 
Cornell & Jackson 
Finney 
Foust 
Jager 
McFate & Fondacaro 
Petraeus, et al. 
Vulnerability 40 6.7 
Coproduction of knowledge 34 5.7 
Data control 27 4.5 
Power 27 4.5 
Uncertainty 18 3 
Academic 
Discourse 
Uncertainty 102 10.2 AAA (x2) 
Albro & Gusterson 
Forte 
Glenn (x2) 
González 
NCA 
Price (x2) 
Vulnerability 82 8.2 
Social control 66 6.6 
Data control 54 5.4 
Coproduction of knowledge 34 3.4 
Disaster 17 1.7 
Public 
Discourse  
Uncertainty 32 6.4 Gezari (x2) 
Weinberger 
Wintersteen 
Wynn 
Social control 24 4.8 
Vulnerability 22 4.4 
Coproduction of knowledge 10 2 
Data control 8 1.6 
Problem-solving 7 1.4 
 
Table 3. Main and Secondary Themes/Frequencies.  
 
Main Themes  Raw Theme Frequency Frequency Average 
Uncertainty 152 7.2 
Vulnerability 144 6.9 
Social control 133 6.3 
Subthemes Theme Frequency Frequency Average 
Data control 89 4.2 
Coproduction of knowledge 78 3.7 
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Applying Results 
Differences in concerns over human subjects research in general is not unexpected given 
that the anthropological community is concerned with the variation among humans and the study 
of that which makes people human, whereas the military is concerned with upholding the 
security of national affairs both foreign and domestic. These differences are indeed reflected in 
frequency variance of the themes identified across military, academic, and public discourse. 
Much of the discourse surrounding the HTS leads readers to believe these spheres have 
significantly different views and agendas and that there is no common ground on which to 
cultivate constructive discussions. Indeed, where these spheres intersect is not necessarily in their 
views or agendas, but rather in shared areas of concern. The discourse analysis performed here 
revealed that there are indeed three common threads of concern across all three spheres.  
The results indicate that the main themes and thus common areas of concern are over 
uncertainty, vulnerability, and social control. The secondary themes, coproduction of knowledge 
and data control, also inform concern with the ethics of HTS in practice. While no particular 
theory or model was selected to frame this research prior to the discourse analysis, each of the 
main and secondary themes that came out of the discourse analysis were found to resonate with 
key parts of Susanna Hoffman’s (1999) model for a cultural response to disaster. In a past 
examination of Hoffman’s model for a different research project, I became familiar with how the 
model is used to explain the processes and particularities of humans’ cultural responses to 
disaster. This model was thus chosen for use in understanding how the emergence and current 
practices of the HTS represent a type of disaster. However, both Hoffman and Anthony Oliver-
Smith do not consider war or other human-made events as disasters (1999:2) despite the fact that 
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Hoffman’s model can apply to such and to my knowledge, applying Hoffman’s model to 
understand war-time practices (such as the HTS) has not been done before.  
The application of Hoffman’s (1999) model will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 as a 
model for understanding ethical issues with HTS as a form of disaster-in-process. But before this 
can be done effectively, a discussion of the historical contexts for the concerns identified through 
the discourse analysis as well as the discourses themselves is necessary. This is because both 
anthropology and the military are products of historical particularity and can only be understood 
in historical context. The social and structural forces that dictate conditions of or concerns over 
vulnerability, uncertainty, and social control are shaped by each institution’s complicated history 
and positions on ethics standards and practices. It is to this history and into the present that I 
attend in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORICAL PAST AND ITS ENDURING CONTROVERSIES 
Social Sciences, Politics, and the Military 
The social sciences, governments, and the military share a complex, intertwined history. Pierre 
Bourdieu suggests that social scientists should “pursue and generalize the work of historical anamnesis” 
(2008:224), and this is most valuable when attempting to recall troubled pasts to understand the present. 
To better understand the controversy surrounding the employment of anthropologists (and other social 
scientists) in the military, and specifically the HTS, it is thus imperative to understand the discipline’s 
engagement with governmental entities in the past as well as its own internal and public controversies 
over ethical practices.   
Late Colonial Past  
While there has been much anthropological concern over the HTS for the past decade, 
mutually beneficial relationships between the anthropological community and government 
entities are indeed historically commonplace. Involvements both in and against war efforts 
around the world are not unprecedented in the social sciences. An acknowledgement of 
anthropology’s role in late colonialism is a necessary step in understanding the current 
relationship between anthropology and entities of power.3  
 The academic discipline of anthropology materialized, in part, out of late colonial 
expansion of Europe for the “colonization of the non-Western world” in the 19th and early 20th 
century (Lewis 1973:582). Many methodological and conceptual frameworks in the discipline 
were, in large part, shaped by the unequal relationship between colonized peoples, 
anthropologists, and colonized powers (Forte 2007). Diane Lewis states that “anthropologists 
found themselves participants in the colonial system which organized relationships between 
                                                 
3
 “Entities of power” is a reference to militaries and governments of varying countries that anthropologists around 
the world have worked for, with, or against.  
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Westerners and non-Westerners” (1973:582). Most notably, the French and British colonial 
endeavor enlisted anthropologists and the research of anthropologists to better understand, 
colonize, and control India and parts of Africa. 
Anthropologists Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski are among those whose research and 
fieldwork were used by British colonial powers in their endeavors.4 Ethnographic knowledge 
produced by anthropologists was used to enrich social, economic, and culturally interested 
imperial powers. Peter Foster argues that “Malinowski was constantly concerned to stress the 
value of anthropology in administration…he suggested that the practical man should state 
problems to stimulate the anthropologist” (1994:51). Malinowski “expressed support for the idea 
of Indirect Rule, though he urged that knowledge of indigenous culture was important for any 
kind of rule (Foster 1994:51). As Malinowski writes, 
forced labour, conscription or voluntary labour contracts, and the difficulties of obtaining 
sufficient numbers—all these form another type of practical difficulties in the colonies. 
The chief trouble in all this is to entice the Native or persuade him to keep him satisfied 
while he works for the white man. [1929:35] 
Another prominent figure in the history of this relationship is Henry Sumner Maine (2008 
[1861]) who researched the “the early history of society, and its relation to modern ideas” and 
shared this knowledge when serving as a member of the council for the governor-general of 
India from 1863-1869. 
 Anthropologists do indeed occupy “a position of economic, political, and psychological 
superiority vis-à-vis the subject people” (Lewis 1973:582) yet during this time this power was 
not considered problematic nor was the use of that power to engage in work on behalf of colonial 
                                                 
4
 It is important to note that Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown were very much products of their time and their 
research and fieldwork were not seen as ethically problematic at the end of the 19th century when they were 
partaking in it.  
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governments. At the beginning of the 20th century, only a very few anthropologists in the western 
world began to see the issues that arose from colonial endeavors. While anthropology had begun 
to create its enduring legacy as a scientific discipline in the 19th century, in the early part of the 
20th century it began collecting baggage surrounding its emergence from colonialism. As Pels 
writes, “the discipline descends from and is still struggling with techniques of observation and 
control that emerged from the colonial dialect of Western” rule and influence (1997:164). 
Early 20th Century Backlash  
At the beginning of the 20th century, Franz Boas, founder of anthropology as an academic 
discipline in the US, began speaking out about the controversial relationship between 
anthropologists and military entities and governments around the world. Even though he was 
alone in this endeavor, in December of 1919 Boas wrote a letter to the The Nation. In this letter, 
titled “Scientists as Spies” and as cited by the AAA (2005:27), he wrote:  
I wish to enter a vigorous protest…that a number of men who follow science as their 
profession, men whom I refuse to designate any longer as scientists, have prostituted 
science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies.  
Just ten days later “a motion of censure…was passed” on him “by the governing council of the” 
AAA “effectively removing him from the council” and they threatened “…expulsion from the 
Association” (AAA 2005:27). During the annual meeting in 2004 the AAA agreed “in principle 
to rescind the original 1919 motion and vote of censure on Boas (AAA 2005:27). This happened 
because the AAA realized “…the points Boas originally raised in his letter” 93 years ago 
“continue to have relevance today" (AAA 2005:27).  
Since Boas’ letter and censure, social scientists have continued to research under the 
funding and interests of governments, including many of Boas’ own anthropology students. Ruth 
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Benedict conducted research titled “Patterns of Culture” (2006[1934]) and later applied it to her 
research in Japanese culture during WWII (1946). Margaret Mead (2000[1953]), and Rhoda 
Metraux (2009[1980]) studied “culture at a distance” during and post-World War II (WWII) 
including but not limited to the “Soviet Union…Germany…and China” (Beeman 2000:xi). Other 
anthropologists were prominent advisors in early 20th century war efforts and continuing colonial 
rule around the world or had research funded by governments with the purpose that the findings 
be used by the military or other government entities.  
Late 20th Century: Darkness in El Dorado and its Significance to Framing the HTS 
 David Price suggests that at times the anthropological community has chosen to ignore 
parts of its politicized past and gloss over less savory aspects of its history (2008:xvi). Indeed, it 
was not until the last quarter of the 20th century that discussion on anthropology’s participation in 
colonial and war efforts re-emerged. This was largely based on questioning the power of 
anthropologists over their subjects, with the emergence of post-colonial thought and theory from 
historically subjugated feminist theorists in the 1970s and scholars from previously colonized 
nations in the 1980s, centered on critiquing authority and power in the anthropological 
discipline. As Peter Pels notes, the anthropological discipline “descends from and is still 
struggling with techniques of observation and control that emerged from the colonial dialectic of 
Western governmentality” (1997:164).  
However, this moment of reflexivity over power and the ethics of practice was internal to 
anthropology. It was not until a transformative controversy arose in 2000 that anthropology as a 
discipline was forced to publicly confront ethical concerns regarding anthropological practices. 
In 2000, journalist Patrick Tierney published Darkness in El Dorado: How Scientists and 
Journalists Devastated the Amazon, accusing anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon and geneticist 
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James Neel of conducting extensive ethnographic research with the Yanomami Indians in 
Roraima, Brazil in 1995 little regard for their subjects’ welfare (2000:xxi). Chagnon’s work had, 
until then, been held in esteem and was being used by “thousands of anthropologists…in their 
classrooms, even though it was clear the field practices he described in it violated the American 
Anthropological Association’s code of ethics” (Borofsky 2005:14). 
Among the issues raised by Tierney are how this research was framed and what 
transpired in Brazil. For example, Tierney wrote that Chagnon, having difficulty getting 
permission for ethnographic work, managed to get the “Indian Agency [of Brazil] to grant 
special permission for a ‘visit of a journalistic or documentary character'” (Tierney 2000:xxi). 
This special request was granted to a photographer who included Chagnon “as a member of his 
‘work team’” (Tierney 2000:xxii). However, once there, Chagnon was actually collecting social 
information and “collecting Yanomami blood samples” (Tierney 2000:xxii). A measles epidemic 
then struck “the same village where…James Neel had scientists inoculate the Yanomami with a 
live virus” that was safe for American children “but was known to be dangerous for immune-
compromised people” (Tierney 2000:17). 
While some of the claims by Tierney were later proven to be false or exaggerated, the 
book launched a public controversy for anthropology, prompting academic and public discourse 
on ethics in the practice of anthropology. Headlines across the country read similar to one from 
Business Week: “Tierney makes a persuasive argument that anthropologists for several decades 
engaged in unethical practices” (Borofsky 2005:12). The AAA eventually commissioned a Task 
Force to investigate the findings in Tierney’s book but according to Rob Borofsky, “leaders of 
the American Anthropological Association initially addressed the controversy more as a problem 
of public relations than as a problem of professional ethics: they were more concerned with 
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protecting the discipline’s image than with dealing directly with the issues Tierney had raised” 
(2005:14, 15). This was despite outrage by anthropologists in the academy and professionals 
external to the discipline over the “media storm that spread around the world” concerning the 
accused “unethical behavior…that at times bordered on the criminal” (Borofsky 2005:3). This 
left many wondering if “anthropology and perhaps science itself had gone astray in allowing 
such behavior to take place” (Borofsky 2005:3).  
According to Thomas A. Gregor and Daniel R. Gross, at the core of criticism surrounding 
the El Dorado controversy was the finding by the AAA Task Force “that Neel and Chagnon 
misused their subjects in the course of ethnographic and biological research, that they failed to 
obtain adequate informed consent for their work, and that their research left the Yanomami 
psychologically damaged” (2004:687). As a result of uncovering these ethical violations, Donald 
Brenneis suggests that the Task Force’s “greatest value... is not to find fault with or to defend the 
past actions of specific anthropologists, but to provide opportunities for all anthropologists to 
consider the ethics of several dimensions of the anthropological enterprise” (2009:8). 
 Many current core concerns over the HTS are then not surprisingly identical to those that 
emerged from the Darkness in El Dorado controversy. Similar to the AAA report on the El 
Dorado controversy, the Network for Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) argued that “like 
medical doctors, anthropologists are ethically bound to do no harm…the HTS program violates 
scientific and federal research standards mandating informed consent by research subjects”  
(N.d.). The NCA also stated that the  
HTS is unethical for anthropologists…in 2007, the AAA determined HTS to be ‘an 
unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.’…The AAA commission found 
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that HTS ‘can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of 
anthropology’ given the incompatibility of HTS with disciplinary ethics and practice.  
Anthropology has taken the lead on public and academic criticisms of the HTS and general 
working relationships between the military and members of the discipline. While other social 
scientists also currently work with the military (i.e. psychologists, sociologists, political 
scientists), the historical particularity of past colonial and war endeavors and the specificity of 
the Darkness in El Dorado controversy shaped anthropology as the dissent leader against the 
HTS. 
Price forcefully argues that “our memory gaps have political consequences. 
Anthropologists’ ignorance of the range of anthropological contributions to…war is now being 
used in CIA and Pentagon recruitment campaigns” (2008:xvi). However, concerns stemming 
from the Darkness in El Dorado controversy clearly bear heavily on anthropology’s issues with 
the HTS as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. While Tierney’s claims have been met 
with skepticism, they have served as a prelude to discussion about the HTS, brought ethics to the 
forefront of the conversation in the social sciences again, and revived discussion on the ethics of 
anthropology’s engagement in war efforts. Both the HTS and the El Dorado controversies 
encompass ethical concerns relevant for all educational sectors that overlap with governmental 
operations. But in order to begin understanding the complexity of the current controversy over 
the HTS, an overview of the recent creation of the program and its relationship to anthropology 
is necessary. 
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The Emergence of the HTS 
 A rationale for the HTS began in 2002 with an identified need for counterinsurgency 
(COIN) actions in the War on Terror (see Figure 3 for additional reference) 5. COIN, by 
definition, is when military or political action is taken against the efforts of 
revolutionaries/guerrillas and “organized military activity is designed to combat insurgency” 
(Merriam-Webster 2014). In US military’s history there has been an extensive record of cultural 
gaps and a need for a “focus on counterinsurgency” but when an insurgency in Iraq began in 
2003, the US was unprepared to fight such (Nagl 2007:xiiv). Unlike other major wars the US had 
experienced, the enemy was aware it could not “defeat the U.S. Army on a conventional 
battlefield” and instead chose to “wage war against America from the shadows” (Nagl 
2007:xxiv). According to Nagl (2007), there are a variety of reasons proposed about why the 
U.S. was not prepared for insurgency in Iraq. “Among the most important [of these] was the lack 
of current counterinsurgency doctrine when the war began” as the Army had not published a 
counterinsurgency manual for over twenty years, the last one being Field Manual 100-20 (FM 
100-20), in the wake of the El Salvador campaign (2007:xiv). According to Andrew J. Birtle, 
prior to that there was largely an absence of “formal, written doctrine” and soldiers had to 
“develop concepts and theories” themselves, “some of which became enduring principles that 
guided Army operations for decades” (2003:vii).  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Not all events listed in the timeline are addressed in this thesis. However, all events (small or large) must be listed 
to understand the main events that are discussed. Forte’s (2010b) timeline was used as a guideline. 
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Figure 3. Timeline: List of Significant Events: HTS (Forte 2010b). 
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4/
12 Defense News 
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6/
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3 Politicians (D. 
Hunter of 
California) 
proposes 
ending the 
program. 
Resistance 
from military 
using HTT
1/
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After the beginning of the War on Terror, the Army realized they were unprepared and 
began investing money in research for a program that would assist them in developing effective 
COIN tactics. The result of this investment was the HTS. As Nagl suggests, the army learned via 
HTS that the “key to success in counterinsurgency is protecting” local populations and 
empowering them with “political, diplomatic, and linguistic skills” in order for them to 
accomplish objectives (2007:xv). Nagl even goes so far as to suggest that most “Army officers 
knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency” (2007:xv). 
 After General Petraeus returned from a second tour in Iraq, the Army began focusing on 
“economic and political development” (Nagl 2007:xv). According to Nagl, Petraeus received a 
promotion as “Lieutenant General with responsibility for the Multi-National Security Transition 
Command in Iraq” and “he focused on the Army’s extensive education systems, making training 
officers about counterinsurgency his top priority” (2007:xv). This training centered on the US 
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), released in 2006. FM 3-
24 was long awaited by not only by military personnel, but also journalists, academics, and the 
enemy. According to Nagl, “the field manual was widely reviewed, including on several Jihadi 
websites; copies have been found in Taliban training camps in Pakistan. It was downloaded more 
than 1.5 million times in the first month after its posting to the Fort Leavenworth and Marine 
Corps Web sites” (2007:xvii). 
 According to the FM 3-24, “the key to victory in counterinsurgency is intelligence on the 
location and identity of the insurgent enemy derived from a supportive population” (Nagl 
2007:xviii). FM 3-24 notes that “defeating insurgency hinges on understanding the nature of 
insurgency and selecting methods that will win the people’s hearts and minds” (Kagan and 
Kagan 2009:x). Mike Moyar points out that COIN tactics require “gaining the cooperation of 
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allied leaders, organizing allied leaders, organizing self-defense forces, winning the support of 
the population, motivating troops, persisting in the face of difficulty, or adjusting methods in 
response to enemy tactics” (2009:126). In order to accomplish this as part of a COIN agenda, the 
U.S. Army recognized a need for cultural advisors and they turned to the discipline that produces 
cultural experts, anthropology, for potential Human Terrain Team (HTT) members. 
Cultural anthropologists, by definition, “deal with human culture especially with respect 
to social structure, language, law, politics, religion, magic, art, and technology” (Merriam-
Webster 2014). While cultural anthropologists are specialists on people in geographical 
locations, they more importantly understand the overall patterns of complexity and diversity of 
human culture. This, along with the qualitative inquiry methods used by cultural anthropologists, 
make them ideal candidates for collecting the information that the US Army needed on local 
populations in areas of operations. As the Army’s target group of prospective employees, 
cultural anthropologists were not only desired for their educational and applied training, but also 
because, as discussed previously, the discipline has a long history of working with the US 
government and military. Anthropologists have historically worked for many governmental 
organizations including the U.S. Department of War, Department of the Interior, Department of 
State and the White House, Institute of Human Relations, Office of Naval Intelligence, the 
Cross-Cultural Survey Project, the Smithsonian Institution’s War Background Studies, the 
Ethnogeographic Board, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and more 
(Price 2008; Lucas 2009; Albro et al. 2012). 
 
  
Figure 4. Screenshot of HTS recruitment email
Starting with the pilot program in 2007 and into the present, anthropologists and other 
social and behavioral scientists have been actively recruited for the HTS. Th
above (Figure 4) is an example of a recruitment email sent by 
HTS recruitment for the US Army, to scholars at 
(Harvard, NYU, and Georgetown, to name a few). Recruitme
least enough to maintain HTS programming. This is likely due in part to the generous 
compensation6 paired with downturns in the academic job market since before 2007.
 
                                                 
6
 For a recruit with a master’s degree, the domestic pay is slightly above the average pay for a first
assistant professor with a doctoral degree and the deployment pay is nearly twice that
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HTS and COIN Tactics in the Middle East 
From the advent of the HTS and to this day, trained anthropologists, along with other 
social scientists, have involved in COIN operations through employment with the HTS. These 
operations have evolved significantly in the last seven years as has the criticism of such 
operations by the military, academics, and the public. The HTS significantly expanded in 2010 
from 5 teams to 30 and from a $20 million budget to a $150 million annual budget (Brook 
2014:1) During this time, an increasing number of military personnel and academic 
anthropologists began paying attention to the 2007 FM 3-24 and the 2008 HTTHB. Such 
attention to increasing demand for the people-centered, ethnographic skills of HTT members not 
only initiated criticism from academics but also from on-the-ground military personal deployed 
in the Middle East. One of the FM 3-24’s most repeated messages in political discourse is to 
“win the hearts and minds” of locals in areas of interest and if possible, of the enemy. However, 
there are gaps between what actions the FM 3-24 outlines for military and HTT members and 
what actually happens on the front lines, in practice for COIN operations. 
Figures 5-7 are the COIN checklist and interview guides from the HTTHB that both HTT 
members and military personnel are expected to use in the field. It must be noted that there is a 
push toward creating specific questionnaires for the following categories: mosque participants, 
mullah and other religious leaders, business & commerce, business owners, second layer 
leadership: mirro (water distributor), teachers, doctors, and elders (Finney 2008:116). Soldiers 
and HTT members alike are given this generic, semi-structured COIN questionnaire and are 
expected to apply it to all people of interest that they encounter, using these basic sets of 
questions when attempting to gain information from the local population. 
 34 
 
 
Figure 5. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 1 of 3). 
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Figure 6. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 2 of 3). 
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Figure 7. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 3 of 3). 
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In addition to, and based from these questions, social scientist HTT members are 
expected to come up with a mapping system for “social structures, linkages, and priorities, just as 
a recon team might map physical terrain” (Pelton 2009:1) For example, this process would 
ideally mean that “by talking to locals the teams might help identify which village elder the 
commander should deal with or which tribe might be a waste of time” or whether or not a 
rebuilding project might engender a conflict between two villages or tribal units (Pelton 2009:1). 
While this may indeed be an outcome from the information collected, there are multiple issues 
that arise with collecting information from people whose human subjects rights may not 
protected after they provide this information. 
A typical pro-HTS rebuttal to this concern would be that this information is collected 
anonymously. However, even if it is completely anonymous, an unlikely possibility given some 
of the questions in the surveys, participants have no way of retracting the information they 
provide. Additionally, providing information to HTT members can place participants in harm’s 
way because there is potential for them to be seen talking to HTTs or perhaps become identified 
as the informant for particular information maybe only they would have known.  
Initial attention to the gap between the practices outlined in the HTTB and FM 3-24 and 
on-the-ground action is worthy of note.7 In a case study on HTT by Norman Nigh, an unnamed 
Marine Corps captain jokingly told Nigh “‘yeah, I’m all about hearts and minds, two shots in the 
heart and one in the head, now that’s COIN’” as he flipped through the FM 3-24 (2012:5). 
Another anonymous military personnel participant in the same 2010 meeting concerning the FM 
3-24 told Nigh that 
The people who wrote this [FM 3-24] don’t understand what it’s like on the ground. It 
sounds good on paper and stuff like this gets people promoted but at the end of the day it’s 
                                                 
7
 Specific violations in the HTS will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
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our lives they are playing with. I am told to secure a village, get to know the people, shake 
hands, take pictures with locals and tell my superiors about what the hell is going on--- 
what bullshit…I have no idea who these people are, what they want, or how to 
communicate with them. The locals accuse me of killing their friends. When we’re not 
getting shot at or finding IEDs, local kids throw rocks at my guys and the locals demand 
money. Yet I am told to exhibit tactical patience and focus on the big picture. The situation 
is fucked. [2012:5] 
According to Nigh, this response represents what is faced by many military personnel 
operating on the ground in Afghanistan at the time. He notes that “talk of COIN is everywhere, 
especially on the lips of senior military and civilian leadership. In practice, COIN presents 
complex operational challenges” (Nigh 2012:6) He agrees that in order for a “company or 
platoon” to fully understand the people they are dealing with they must have knowledge of “local 
customs…and traditions” (Nigh 2012:6). However, most soldiers have not “studied the region’s 
history or its tribal languages, and consequently struggle to interact with local populations” and 
instead “the generic COIN checklist and principles handed down from headquarters are rarely 
applicable to specific situations, and only exacerbate the challenges of implementing 
counterinsurgency strategies” (Nigh 2012:6, see Figures 6-8).  
The directives provided in the FM 3-24 do not always become actualized in COIN in 
practice on-the-ground and this is a critical example of how the humanistic goals of HTS are 
compromised in real-life application, a key component of academic, military, and public 
criticism of HTS. It also underscores the very real need for quality-trained social scientists as 
well as the challenges they face on HTTs and while working with military personnel who do not 
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have the same social sciences training. However, issues over non-transparent ethical practice in 
the HTS are, in many ways, preventing constructive discussion on this very real need. 
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CHAPTER 4. ETHICS: STANDARDS AND PRACTICE 
 What, precisely, are the distinctions in ethics positions between anthropology and the 
military that inform anthropology’s concern with the HTS and ethical practice? In this chapter I 
address these positions and the policies and practices required of anthropologists and persons in 
human subjects research in the military, specifically the HTS. This frames and outlines what I 
argue to be the key theme of the controversy and conflict, uncertainty, which takes several forms. 
Ethics in Anthropology 
The AAA represents anthropology as an academic and professional organization. As with 
other academic organizations, particularly in the social and behavioral sciences, the AAA 
produces official statements on many issues including on the ethics of professional practice. 
These are, however, just guiding standards for practice rather than enforceable policies for 
practice. Policies and protocols are the domain of the federal government via local human 
subjects protection units within organizations. For academic anthropologists employed by 
universities and practicing anthropologists in organizations such as museums and social or 
medical services, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) associated with their institutions oversee 
the review and approval of research protocols, ethics training, and practice accountability. Most 
of these IRBs are internal to institutions themselves but operate under federal oversight, bound to 
follow the regulations set forth by the government for human subjects research. This section 
outlines the AAA ethical practice guidelines as they are reinforced by IRBs and federal human 
subjects research regulations. 
The AAA’s position on ethics is laid out in the American Anthropological Association’s 
Statement on Ethics; Principles of Professional Responsibility (2012). This statement has been 
updated a total of four times since its original creation in 1971. It was amended up through 1986, 
 41 
 
and then significantly updated in 1998, 2009, and 2012 (AAA 2012). The fairly regular updates 
indicate that anthropology has responded to ethical issues over time as new contexts of practice 
and ethics issues have arisen.  
The AAA statements on ethics includes seven “core principles” for practice: 1) Do no 
harm 2) Be open and honest regarding your work 3) Obtain informed consent and necessary 
permission 4) Weigh competing ethical obligations due collaborators and affected parties 5) 
Make your results accessible 6) Protect and preserve your records 7) Maintain respectful and 
ethical professional relationships (2012:1). The most important of these for the sake of this thesis 
is the principle of “do no harm” as the goal is to protect the subjects of anthropological study 
from physical, social, and psychological harm. This goal is rooted in both the Belmont Report (as 
will be discussed in the next section) and a shared professional ethic of human rights as 
foundational to human culture. 
The AAA declaration in regards to anthropology and human rights “defines the basis for 
the involvement of the American Anthropological Association, and more generally, of the 
profession of Anthropology in human rights” (AAA 1999, emphasis added). The AAA declares 
“an ethical commitment to the equal opportunity of all cultures, societies, and persons to realize 
this capacity in their cultural identities and social lives” (1999). The AAA states, “when any 
culture or society denies or permits the denial of such opportunity to any of its own members or 
others” that the organization itself has an ethical responsibility to protest and oppose such 
deprivation” (AAA 1999). The discipline of anthropology, academic or professional, is thus “a 
profession is committed to the promotion and protection of the right of people and peoples 
everywhere to the full realization of their humanity, which is to say their capacity for culture” 
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(1999). The AAA position grounds practice expectations for anthropologists working in any 
capacity and this includes working for the military. 
The 2012 AAA statement on ethics reflects the Belmont Report’s three “basic ethical 
principles”: “1) Respect for Persons 2) Beneficence 3) Justice” (1979:1). The 1979 Belmont 
Report lays out ethical principles and guidelines for research involving human subjects” and this 
informs policies for human subjects protection in research as provided in the Code of Federal 
Regulations for the Department of Health and Human Services (45 CFR 46). 45 CFR 46 outlines 
compliance required of any institution whose members do research supported by any federal 
agency or department.8 It includes the establishment of and procedures for institutions’ IRBs and 
clear and concise rules for human subjects research protocols.  
While the Belmont Report and subsequent policies in 45 CFR 46 were all created with 
biomedical research in mind, all forms of social research involving living humans is subject to 45 
CFR 46 including anthropological research. Every practicing anthropologist working in the 
academy is bound by the Human Subjects Protection Program (HSPP) and its IRB at the 
university where they are employed. Ethics training is required and all research proposals must 
be submitted to their HSPP for review by the IRB and comply with all policies and regulations of 
the IRB and 45 CFR 46. Research projects are subject to ongoing oversight by HSPP/IRBs 
including audits to ensure that protocols are followed and ongoing ethics training is required. 
Violations of these policies and regulations can result in sanctions as extreme as the suspension 
of research and institutional de-funding. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Many organizations and companies outside of academia (i.e. medical clinics and large corporations doing social 
and biomedical research) also have to comply with 45 CFR 46.  
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Ethics in the HTS 
The military’s overall position on ethics is applicable to both active and non-active duty 
members in multiple branches. The official document on ethics is the Department of Defense 
Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), referred to here by its issuance number, DoD 5500.7-R. DoD 
5500.7-R states that:  
Ethics are standards by which one should act based on values. Values are core beliefs 
such as duty, honor, and integrity that motivate attitudes and actions. Not all values are 
ethical values (integrity is; happiness is not). Ethical values relate to what is right and 
wrong and thus take precedence over nonethical values when making ethical decisions. 
[1993:118] 
This document also includes two lists regarding ethics. The first is a list of individual character 
values: “1) Honesty 2) Integrity 3) Loyalty 4) Accountability 5) Fairness 6) Caring 7) Respect 8) 
Promise Keeping 9) Responsible Citizenship 10) Pursuit of Excellence (DoD 5500.7-R 
1993:118-119). The second list, more relevant to concerns with the HTS, is titled “Ethical 
Decision-Making” (EDMP) and lists its values as follows: 1) Define the Problem 2) Identify the 
Goal(s) 3) List Applicable Laws or Regulations 4) List the Ethical Values at Stake 5) Name all 
the Stakeholders 6) Gather Additional Information 7) State All Feasible Solutions 8) Eliminate 
Unethical Options 9) Rank Remaining Solutions 10) Commit To and Implement the Best Ethical 
Solution (DoD 5500.7-R 2011:119-121).  
In terms of policy and procedures as required in federal policy, in 2002 Paul Wolfwitz, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, “canceled previous DoD directives concerning research with 
human subjects and implemented 32 CFR 219” and “32 CFR 219 is identical…to 45 CFR 46, 
‘the common rule’” (Strong 2007:1) Multiple “federal departments and agencies” had begun 
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“implementing the Common Rule” (e.g., 45 CFR 46) and those such as the DoD, Department of 
Justice (DoJ), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), all of which are now in part involved 
with the HTS, are to adhere to the Common Rule of protecting human subjects (Rose 2012:3-5).  
Standards in DoD-Supported Research do now require that “all research involving human 
subjects that is conducted or supported by the Department of Defense shall comply with part 219 
of Reference (c) [32 CFR 219] which incorporates the ethical principles of respect for persons, 
beneficence, and justice” (DoD 3216.02 2011:2). However, “there are waivers they can apply to 
programs like the US Army’s HTS” (Stanton 2010:1). 
 It remains unclear what policies were being followed by the earliest HTS teams prior to 
2008 or how reviews of proposed research for human subjects protection were being performed 
then and into the present. The 2010 Congressionally Directed Assessment of the Human Terrain 
System report notes that a 2008 change to the HTS was the “creation of an ethics committee and 
the writing of guidelines” (Clinton et al. 2010:72). This is consistent with information from the 
HTTHB whereby HTTs must create, as part of area of operations research proposals, a document 
explaining how the “research will comply with the protection of human research subjects 
according to 45 CFR 46 to ensure the research falls within accepted ethical guidelines” (Finney 
2008:55). According to the handbook, HTT research is to be implemented “in the same manner 
in which academic social scientists conduct their research and is similarly rooted in theory and 
complete with ethical review boards” (Finney 2008:56). The HTTHB also lists the following as 
an entry under “Team Best Practices”: to “provide focused study on social science, cultural or 
ethnographic issues of specific concern to the Commander by conducting social science research 
that adhere to the ethics of Anthropology and Sociology (Finney 2008:81). 
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In mid-2010, the HTS Social Science Directorate was currently seeking to fill two 
positions whose responsibilities included “to review all HTS research plan designs, determine 
whether they adhere to research and ethical guidelines, and provide mentorship to new personnel 
who are writing research plans” (Clinton et al. 2010:35). The HTS Social Science Directorate 
hired Christopher King (Ph.D. in anthropology) as Director in 2011, replacing McFate who had 
been the director since the inception of HTS. As Director, King oversaw the HTS HSPP. At a 
presentation at the University of Hawaii Manoa, King outlined current HTS practice in 2011 as 
was possible using unclassified information.  
According to King, ethics training occurs before deployment with eight hours and 14 
modules an “online CITI training accompanied by two hours for broad overview of federal 
standards” followed by “approximately 22 hours of ethics training for social scientists and about 
10 hours all other positions” (2011:9). For social scientists, an addition 12 hours of time is spent 
covering “ethical research and design,” ethical practices exercises, and compliance form use 
(2011:9). This is part of a 55-day pre-deployment training/pre-mission certification program that 
also includes research design/implementation training as well as culture and language training.  
Ethics training and follow-up continue the field with the Social Science Directorate 
communicating with teams through emails, telephone, teleconference, and quarterly analysis of 
finished products. The Social Science Mobile Knowledge Team also “provides on-site assistance 
and mentoring to deployed HTTs and Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs)” (King 2011:9).  
While it is clear from the HTTHB and the HTS Social Science Directorate that ethics standards 
exist and that ethics training is critical to HTS, the process for review and approval of human 
subjects research proposals by the equivalent of an IRB as required by 45 CFR 46 or 32 CFR 219 
is not clear. 
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Anthropology’s Position on the HTS 
As institutions with significantly different goals, anthropology and the military both 
“draw distinctions [between how they go] about research, data collection, advising, and 
intelligence, as well as differences between these activities” (AAA 2009a:25). However, both 
are, as noted above, grounded in professional ethics standards as well as have policies and 
regulations for ethical practice regarding the protection of human subjects. A “cultural shift” in 
the military brought discrepancies in ethical practice and all other aspects of research related to 
human subjects protection to the forefront of professional discourse. For one, in 2008 the DoD-
funded Minerva Initiative was enacted “to balance military-funded research in support of ‘basic 
research’ in the social sciences” and more strongly incorporate “people and perspectives from 
the social science disciplines that foreground field research” (AAA 2009a:25). This followed the 
emergence of the deployment of HTTs in the HTS program and the early formalization of the 
AAA’s position opposing the HTS. The incorporation of social scientists in research for COIN in 
areas of operations produced a still-ongoing controversy over precisely how ethics are practiced 
and human subjects protected. 
The AAA’s disapproval of the HTS became public in October of 2007, just nine months 
after the launch of the HTS in the Army’s COIN program. This very prompt public response is 
likely the result of intersecting issues. First, anthropology’s past history (see Chapter 3) with the 
military and working on behalf of colonial powers is likely a key motivation for a rapid response 
to current military intelligence research activities. Second, such a quick response may, in part, be 
credited to anthropology’s last major public ethics debacle, the El Dorado controversy (see 
Chapter 3). As Borofsky has suggested, “anthropologists cannot simply claim to be moral and 
expect others in nonacademic settings to trust them on that basis, especially given the 
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discipline’s record to date” (2005:16) thus their reputations are at stake when any ethics issues 
related to the discipline arise.  
The public statement was produced by a commission established by the Executive Board 
of the Association and “based on information in the public record, as well as on information and 
comments provided to the Executive Board by the Ad Hoc Commission and its members” 
(2007:1). Five major concerns stated in the AAA 2007 Executive Board Statement on the Human 
Terrain System Project (2007:1, emphases added) are as follows: 
1. As military contractors working in settings of war, HTS anthropologists work in 
situations where it will not always be possible for them to distinguish themselves from 
military personnel and identify themselves as anthropologists. This places a significant 
constraint on their ability to fulfill their ethical responsibility as anthropologists to 
disclose who they are and what they are doing. 
2. HTS anthropologists are charged with responsibility for negotiating relations among a 
number of groups, including both local populations and the U.S. military units that 
employ them and in which they are embedded. Consequently, HTS anthropologists may 
have responsibilities to their U.S. military units in war zones that conflict with their 
obligations to the persons they study or consult, specifically the obligation, stipulated in 
the AAA Code of Ethics, to do no harm to those they study. 
3. HTS anthropologists work in a war zone under conditions that make it difficult for 
those they communicate with to give “informed consent” without coercion, or for this 
consent to be taken at face value or freely refused. As a result, “voluntary informed 
consent” (as stipulated by the AAA Code of Ethics, section III, A, 4) is compromised. 
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4. As members of HTS teams, anthropologists provide information and counsel to U.S. 
military field commanders. This poses a risk that information provided by HTS 
anthropologists could be used to make decisions about identifying and selecting specific 
populations as targets of U.S. military operations either in the short or long term. Any 
such use of fieldwork-derived information would violate the stipulations in the AAA 
Code of Ethics that those studied not be harmed.  
5. Because HTS identifies anthropology and anthropologists with U.S. military 
operations, this identification—given the existing range of globally dispersed 
understandings of U.S. militarism—may create serious difficulties for, including grave 
risks to the personal safety of, many non-HTS anthropologists and the people they study.  
This statement strongly highlights key issues of ethical responsibility, to “do not harm,” the risk 
of information misuse to harm, and the risks that a militarization of anthropology could have.  
The AAA openly concedes it did not complete a full “systematic study” for this statement 
(AAA 2007:1). In a field of study where rigorous ethnographic inquiry key to evidence for 
making any hypothesis or claim, this lack of depth is uncharacteristic of the discipline. The 2009 
Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with United States Military and Intelligence 
Communities (CEAUSSIC) completed a more systematic study that included accounts of HTS 
issues from both soldiers’ and anthropologists’ perspectives. Concerns raised in the CEAUSSIC 
report focus on “the establishment of voluntary informed consent, taking care to insure that no 
harm comes to research participants as a result of HTS research, and full disclosure to research 
participants what will be done with collected data” (AAA 2009a:42). This centered primarily on 
two issues. One was the absence of consideration of AAA ethics standards during the design of 
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HTS by HTS personnel. The second was confirmatory evidence that the HTS has thus far had an 
“avoidance of Institutional Review Board oversight” (AAA 2009a:42).  
The CEAUSSIC report included some positive material regarding the HTS and HTT as 
assisting in harm reduction. For example, one HTT employee, an anthropologist working with 
the 2nd Brigade Combat Team/1st Armored Division in Iraq told CEAUSSIC that “we were able 
to directly or indirectly conceptualize and influence virtually all of our brigade’s problem sets 
and provide nonlethal options to resolve them” (AAA 2009a:27). However, other information 
revealed problems with training. HTT members said that “the concept of HTT is good. What I 
think we’re missing is that we’re not recruiting the right people” and “the training curriculum 
(for HTS) was put together in ad hoc fashion by a retired colonel with no social science 
background” (AAA 2009a:20). These same HTT employees noted that “training was completely 
inadequate and doesn’t prepare people…it’s generic training” and “everything is extremely 
rushed, in part because they are trying to ramp it up so fast” (AAA 2009a:20).  
Another issue raised in the CEAUSSIC report was of militarization of HTT members. 
One HTT employee confessed that “they [the soldiers who accompany HTT members making 
the rounds] expect you to be fully engaged in the heat of battle, during a course of action, not 
taking a knee” (AAA 2009:22). This also speaks to a serious concern with the safety of and 
violence against a number of people whom the HTS involves, one informed by the AAA’s 
position on human rights. The AAA declares an  
ethical commitment to the equal opportunity of all cultures, societies, and persons to 
realize this capacity in their cultural identities and social lives. However, the global 
environment is fraught with violence which is perpetrated by states and their 
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representatives, corporations, and other actors. That violence limits the humanity of 
individuals and collectives. [AAA 1999]  
Violence against innocent bystander civilians is thus also an issue for the AAA. In HTS practices 
there is an undeniable threat of violence given that HTTs operate largely in a conflict zone and 
collateral damage is always possible. The CEAUSSIC report “highlights the admission – in a 
response by HTS to a query from the commission – that it is possible that those who interact with 
HTTs may become subject to ‘lethal targeting’, even if by insurgent groups rather than US 
forces” (AAA 2009a:32, Zehfuss 2012:179). The safety of anthropologists is also at stake. Three 
anthropologists died in the field while working for HTS: Michael Bhatia was killed along with 
two other soldiers by an improvised explosive device (IED), Nicole Suveges was killed beside 
11 other soldiers when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in Sadr City, and Paula 
Lloyd was fatally injured when she was doused with gasoline and lit on fire in the village of 
Chehel Gazi (Stanton 2009:189).  
The Conflict: Uncertainty 
Anthropology and the military do share a concern with ethical practices. Both have ethics 
guidelines, aspirational statements aimed at educating institution members about professional 
values, representing disciplines to the public, preempting external regulation, and, not 
inconsequentially, “providing members with professionally principled rationales in employment 
and consultancy contract negotiations” (Lederman 2009:12). Both are bound in practice, to 
federal regulations, the DoD to 32 CFR 219 and academic anthropologists to 45 CFR 46. Yet the 
controversy, conflict, and debate over ethics remains.  
Based on the discourse analysis of materials covering the issue of ethics in the HTS from 
three domains (military/government, academe, the public), the discussion of the ethics standards 
and practices of both anthropology and the military, and identification of the AAA position on 
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HTS, I argue that uncertainty is at the heart of this conflict. For the AAA and many 
anthropologists, this includes uncertainty over policies and protocols that ensure HSPP review to 
ensure, as much as is possible, that no harm is done in the process or as a result of HTS 
operations. This encompasses not only IRB review but informed consent and issues surrounding 
the used of data collected that could cause harm. Uncertainty exists about the rigor of training 
and the militarization of HTS social sciences and over the risk of violence and death for HTT 
members and indigenous civilian populations. This overwhelming uncertainty is, in large part, 
what makes the HTS, at least in its state from inception into the present, a disaster-in-process. 
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CHAPTER 5. HTS AS A DISASTER: USING HOFFMAN’S MODEL 
 To better understand the complexity of the conflict over the HTS and identify potential 
ways to move forward with ideas for addressing those concerns, the initial discourse analysis 
results were applied to Hoffman’s (1999) model of cultural response to disaster in the context of 
the discussion on ethics standards and practice. Hoffman’s (1999) model is useful in disaster 
studies not for analyzing disaster events (“the actual tornado”) but the processes of sociocultural 
human behavior and response to a disaster. Oliver-Smith argues that a focus on the social and 
cultural aspects of disaster allows us to be “dealing with one dimension of the processual aspect 
of disaster” over time instead of just the event itself. (2002:23). However, as previously noted, 
both Hoffman and Oliver-Smith do not consider war and man-made events disaster (1999:2) thus 
the application of the model to HTS as a wartime phenomenon is novel. This model will thus be 
used to argue for an understanding of the HTS as a disaster-in-process. The model allows for a 
critical discussion of the themes that arose through discourse analysis as they represent 
discourses of military, academics, and public spheres and the conflicts between these spheres 
over ethical practices. 
Hoffman’s (1999) original model, created to map and understand the sociocultural 
phenomena that followed the Oakland firestorm of 1991, includes four phases: the disaster event, 
the crisis, the aftermath nexus, and the passage to closure. The conceptual illustration below 
(Figure 8) is inspired by this model and adapted to frame the concerns about HTS. The 
emergence and establishment of HTS as an Army COIN program is the “disaster event.” The 
“crisis” phase is represented by issues of uncertainty and vulnerability. Next, issues of social 
control are represented as the “aftermath nexus.” Last, the actual and potential outcomes of HTS 
are represented as the “passage to closure” which cycles forward back to disaster. The center of 
 53 
 
the model represents the continual coproduction of knowledge by involved and concerned 
institutions. The discussions below of each phase of the model refer both to the materials 
subjected to discourse analysis (see Chapter 2) and information from Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 8. Conceptual model based on Hoffman (1999). 
The Crisis Phase: Uncertainty and Vulnerability 
 The HTS was created by the US military when successes in the War on Terror were in 
steady decline and new methods to fight insurgents were needed. The HTS was developed by 
persons trained in anthropology and once established, anthropologists found themselves to be 
desirable for their cultural expertise and ethnographic skills, much as they were in the past. The 
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HTS was created as a response to military uncertainty about and vulnerability to insurgents and it 
in turn created a crisis phase of concerns over uncertainty and vulnerability affecting a much 
broader set of involved populations. In the crisis phase, social groups (here the military and 
anthropology) are disrupted by a disaster event and placed into a shared liminal state through 
which they negotiate transformed subject positions shaped by the disaster itself. 
Uncertainty 
The most dominant theme revealed in the process of discourse analysis was uncertainty. 
It was the top theme for both academic and public discourse while it was the lowest-ranking 
theme in military discourse. According to Gregory Button, “uncertainty does not simply exist—it 
is produced, and the production of uncertainty can result in new political, economic, and social 
formations. This informational uncertainty generates conflicting public discourse about blame 
and the responsibility for remediation” (2010:11). Contemporary relations between the military 
and anthropology were already tenuous going into the War on Terror. “Informational uncertainty 
can create individual and community-wide stress” and exacerbate existing relations (Button 
2010:11) and this phenomena is at the start and heart of the crisis phase following the emergence 
of HTS as a pilot program. In the crisis phase and beyond, uncertainty here is produced and 
maintained largely by the military as an entity of power.  
One reason for so much tense uncertainty between the military and anthropology is the 
need for the coproduction of cultural knowledge but an unresolved lack of transparency over the 
use of data collected by HTS social scientists. Sheila Miyoshi Jager states that “especially amid 
the domestic acrimony spawned by the Iraq War, inadequate coordination between military and 
nonmilitary power [such as academics] will severely hamper U.S. counterinsurgency 
capabilities.” (2007:vii). Kevin Orr and Mike Bennett argue that “cooperation and greater 
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interaction between theory and practice can generate a whole range of benefits including 
bringing local knowledge to bear on a problem” (2012:1) including military challenges. 
According to Price, “asymmetrical wars of the twenty-first century now look toward 
anthropology with hopes of finding models of culture, or data on specific cultures to be 
conquered or to be used in counterinsurgency operations” (2009b:1).  
Many military personnel believe that the work of embedded social scientists via the HTS 
is invaluable to the military agenda. McFate and Steve Fondacaro quote an active duty solider 
noting:  
This is my third rotation, but we’ve always done a horseshit job at it [referencing cultural 
data collection]. We don’t have enough patience. Everything we do is focused on 
security. But they can get after a problem set and be more academic about it…We have a 
tendency to bullshit and say ‘this is how people feel’ but having a dedicated academic 
supported by operators, they can achieve a lot more accurate data. [2012:78] 
But Orr and Bennett also indicate that “such research takes place within a political environment 
that requires continual negotiation of different interests” and because of this, there are also 
negative aspects to coproduction of knowledge (2012:1). Major Ben Connable suggests that “by 
doctrine, mission, and organization, the US military is mandated to train and maintain organic 
cultural expertise. Staffs are required to conduct training in the navigation of cultural terrain. 
Cultural information is inextricably linked to the intelligence process” (2009:59).  
The emergence of the HTS made the collection of this kind of cultural information 
possible internally by employing academics but the use of that information to potentially cause 
harm concerns many. “Scientific practice and knowledge-making is constantly producing new 
parameters of what risk means, and thus molding the ever-changing landscapes of uncertainty” 
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(Cornell and Jackson 2013:508) and in the context of war, new kinds of risks emerge. Concerned 
anthropologists see novel risks in coproducing knowledge with the military because of 
uncertainty over how this information is going to be used in COIN operations in terms of 
potential harm to civilians. This is where uncertainty creates questions about making vulnerable 
populations in conflict zones even more vulnerable, violating ethical values of “do no harm.” 
Vulnerability 
By definition, vulnerability is to be in a position to be easily hurt or harmed physically, 
mentally, or emotionally and/or open to attack harm, or damage (Merriam-Webster 2014). 
Lakshmi Fjord notes that “vulnerable persons are... people, grouped by their lack of particular 
physical, emotional, cognitive or social resources which seem to explain their disproportionate 
harms from disasters and the everyday” (2010: 13). Human vulnerability, specifically regarding 
time of war, is shaped by cultural, political, and social conditions and exploited by those in 
power, be they insurgents or counterinsurgency forces. Vulnerability as a dominant theme was 
identified in all coded institutions discourses and ranked as the #2 most dominant in military and 
academic discourse and #3 in public discourse. Of concern in this discussion “is the way in 
which people construct or ‘frame’…vulnerability, including at times the denial of it” (Hoffman 
and Oliver-Smith 1999:8). The actual term “vulnerable” was almost non-existent in the military 
discourse, mentioned only once. Instead military discourse spoke to “risks” in lieu of 
vulnerability proper while academic and public discourse focused on “the underlying conditions 
[and outcomes]” (Alwang et al. 2001:ii). The explicit use of the terms “vulnerable/vulnerability” 
were primarily found in academic and public discourse. 
According to Price, “safeguards protecting gathered data for use by military or 
intelligence agencies are absent” (2009b:4) and HTS employed anthropologists are unable to 
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guarantee that the data they collect for HTS will cause no harm those who are noncombatant 
participants in the research. A lack of being able to control data produces uncertainty about 
creating new forms of vulnerability or exacerbating existing vulnerability given that populations 
in areas of war are vulnerable before foreign military powers intervene. Price argues that HTS 
practices raise “serious political, ethical, and practical problems for anthropologists” because 
HTS social scientists’ reports “can be used by military and intelligence agencies in ways that can 
make studied populations vulnerable” (Price 2009b:3). As González argues, “widespread 
concern” and uncertainty are key concerns for other, even more extreme forms of vulnerability 
such as “how interrogators might use readily accessible ethnographic data for the abuse and 
torture of prisoners” (2007:2). 
Anthropologists are the experts in ethnographic research and their primary focus is to “do 
no harm” to their subjects, and “weigh competing ethical obligations to research 
participants,…professional colleagues, employers and funders,…while recognizing that 
obligations to vulnerable populations are particularly important and primary (AAA 2012). The 
complexity inherent in these multiple relationships creates sometimes competing loyalties for an 
anthropologist as “varying relationships may create conflicting ethical obligations, reflecting 
both the relative vulnerabilities of different individuals, communities or populations, 
asymmetries of power implicit in a range of relationships, and the differing ethical frameworks 
of collaborators representing other disciplines or areas of practice” (AAA 2012). A primary 
concern for anthropologists concerned with the HTS is thus how to decrease noncombatant 
populations’ “struggle to secure an increasingly uncertain tomorrow from an increasingly 
vulnerable today” (Sider 2011:1). A lack of control over data is directly linked to the 
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continuation or exacerbation of vulnerability and, “if vulnerability was part of the ideology, it is 
now manifest” (1999:140) in the crisis stage. 
The Aftermath Nexus: Social Control 
Concerns over uncertainty and vulnerability emerged as soon as the HTS was proposed 
and they multiplied as the HTS became a permanent Army program. These concerns remain 
unresolved and have continued into the aftermath nexus stage, the phase when social groups 
affected by a disaster event attempt to re-ground after experiencing the crisis. This is “more 
prolonged phase… its length depends on the…particular circumstance, but generally lasts from 
some months to some years” according to Hoffman (1999:141). It is in this phase that affected 
groups establish new social and/or ideological boundaries between one another or reinforce older 
ones as a means to recover from or resolve the crisis at hand. Hoffman claims that its length 
“depends on the place, the disaster, and the particular circumstance” (1999:141).   
In this particular case, vulnerability and uncertainty in the crisis phase produces a concern 
with and enacting of social control. Social control, by definition, “refers generally to societal and 
political mechanisms or processes that regulate individual and group behavior in an attempt to 
gain conformity and compliance to the rules of a given society, state, or social group” (Merriam-
Webster 2014). Social control was an unexpected theme that emerged through the discourse 
analysis – it took reading between the lines to find that the other two dominant themes were in 
fact informing social control concerns about the military and the HTS. Social control is not only 
produced by vulnerability and uncertainty, but it is enforced through the coproduction of 
knowledge and data control, primarily by the military. Social control was the #1 theme in 
military discourse analyzed and #2 in academic and public discourse on the HTS. Discourse 
from anthropologists demonstrated explicit concern with social control whereas in military 
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discourse, social control was a part of agenda content and goals. This creates two distinct and 
opposing groups, one concerned with social control, the other concerned with implementing 
social control. 
For example, anthropologist Price writes that “in the past, when military planners and 
colonial administrators sought the counsel of anthropologists, they looked for a social science 
stripped of ambiguity, meaning, and context. They wanted simple analytical tools that might help 
them accomplish short-term objectives” of governance and control (2009b:5). Likewise, 
anthropologists currently “commissioned by the Pentagon as counterinsurgency consultants use 
the same tools as instruments for manipulation and social control—not as a means of humanizing 
other people” (Price 2009:5). 
As the HTS has become a permanent program and grown, social control and power over 
populations in war zones is thus being facilitated by anthropologists in the HTS coproducing 
cultural knowledge with other HTS social scientists and military personnel. What the 
anthropological perspective has added to a “simplistic counting of the number of war dead as an 
indicator” of how lethal the military is without the HTS, is that it “provides more nuanced and 
multifaceted data” on lethal vs. non-lethal, “inequality, and social control” (Harrod and Martin 
2014:11). The potential for social control to have no limits is because HTT members do not 
“maintain control over the collection and storage of the data they collected. HTS, as a program, 
cannot guarantee that this data could not be used by others for other purposes, potentially 
including lethal targeting” (McFate and Fondacaro 2012:3) and, I argue, less deadly but 
potentially dehumanizing forms of social control. 
 Also of concern are the outdated and “primitivist” concepts, theories, and methods being 
used in the HTS for research design. González states that “Montgomery McFate (the Pentagon’s 
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senior social science advisor for HTS)” has revealed that she “relied heavily upon the concept of 
‘tribalism’, functionalist theory, and data collection methods developed for the Human Relations 
Area Files” and the use of “social network analysis” (2009:2). He continues by stating that all of 
“these elements was either created or elaborated” when anthropologists were employed by 
colonial governments “to more effectively control indigenous populations” (2009:2). González 
insists that “it’s no accident that these are precisely the tools advocated by the HTS’s architects” 
(2009:2). Social control is “established in…roles” (like HTS) “and is perpetuated by the very 
forces directed to its elimination or control” (Lemert 1972:i). 
 Concern over social control is an element that “contributes to the complexity of 
recovery” from and working through issues of uncertainty and vulnerability as they presented in 
the crisis phase after the emergence of the HTS (Hoffman 1999:144). It bears on how 
anthropology and the military engage in discourse on the HTS and address each others’ concerns 
in ways that consider the different goals of each institution in constructive dialog as a part of the 
passage to closure on this controversy. And it wraps back to issues of uncertainty as they bear on 
transparency for the HTS in regards to ethical research practices, something currently deeply 
hidden in the classified world of military procedures, exemplifying yet another form of power 
and social control: the control of information. 
The Passage to Closure: More Uncertainty 
 Despite its name, the “passage to closure” phase does not signal a finite end; it is simply a 
step in the cycle that continues into the future as new crisis phases may occur (Hoffman 
1999:149). It is a phase where social groups engage in a “return to…the calamity” in order to re-
make their social worlds as they have been transformed by crisis (Hoffman 1999:149). Hoffman 
notes that in this step, “some sort of settlement” is appropriate, “desirable or not” (Hoffman 
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1999:149) and here the “settlement” is potentially coming to a working relationship for the 
coproduction of cultural knowledge between anthropology and the military as institutions of 
power. This requires change on the parts of both anthropology and the military and it can create 
more uncertainty as part of moving towards closure. 
Hoffman suggests that in this phase, “the question of change is a complex one. 
Sometimes a calamity is a bridge to change…at other times changes meld together, with timeless 
practices providing only new content for old formats” (1999:151). She also states that “if little 
else, disaster usually spurs increased political awareness” (Hoffman 1999:151) or other forms of 
awareness. It has been argued that anthropology’s public and disciplinary reputations have been 
questioned because of the concerns over ethical practice in the HTS, as both an ethical dilemma 
and an ethical disaster (Lin 2009:155). And while “perpetuating former practices” (like those 
from the troubled history of anthropology and the military) can occur in this phase, “a new 
horizon” may also emerge (1999:152). A new horizon here would be to create an opportunity for 
anthropology to continue the discussion on the HTS and military/anthropology relationships but 
in the context of creating transparency regarding the protections of human subjects. 
We are, at this moment, in the passage to closure phase, at a detente between 
anthropology and the military. Anthropology and the military need to engage in discourse on the 
HTS and address each others’ concerns in ways that consider the shared and different goals of 
each institution in constructive dialog as a part of the passage to closure on this controversy. And 
this wraps back to issues of uncertainty as they bear on transparency for the HTS in regards to 
ethical research practices, something currently deeply hidden in the classified world of military 
procedures. We must also come to an understanding that like HTT members, some 
anthropologists “may [too] have doubtful motivations, that their work may be improperly used, 
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and that the ultimate effect on those studied is not predictable” (Whittaker 1981:437). Likewise, 
as Orr and Bennett suggest, “it is disingenuous to imply through the presentation of social 
science that research is a clean, objective process carried out by purists who stand above politics, 
and this picture if further complicated in join projects, where participants are mindful of a 
complexity of interacting demands and interests” (2012:3). 
Catastrophes and the social responses that follow may vary from calamity to calamity, 
but the disasters that occur, and the human response to them, is a cycle repeated time and again 
that has within in the potential for positive transformation. But how can anthropologists work 
toward addressing the ethical issues evident in working with the HTS? I thus argue that moving 
forward in the passage to closure on the HTS requires anthropology to engage productively with 
the military on neutral ground rather than opt out of all engagement. Several scholars have made 
recommendations for such that are centered on the concerns with ethical practice found in this 
thesis: uncertainty, vulnerability, social control, transparency.  
For example, George R Lucas, a military ethicist at the US Naval Academy, that 
anthropologists should “create a nongovernmental organization” like “Anthropologists Without 
Borders…that would advise the military but would not actually be employed by the military” 
(Glenn 2009b:1). While Connable suggests that “the practice of deploying academics to a 
combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is trying to build, or more 
accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of the 
U.S. military since the Viet Nam era” (2009:58), for anthropology to not work with the military 
is to fundamentally violate our own publically stated value of working to solve real world 
problems with our research.  
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CHAPTER 6. HTS NOW, HTS IN THE FUTURE: A CONCLUSION 
Conclusive Overview 
The chief objective of this study was to analyze and evaluate conflicts and debates 
between anthropologists and the military focused on the ethics of human subjects research and 
the ethical uses of data collected through social scientists contracted by the military. At the 
center of this conflict was the creation and implementation of the HTS by the US military, and 
specifically the “recruitment of anthropologists to provide ‘cultural knowledge’ for the purpose 
of more effective counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Forte 2011:149). Research 
questions thus focused on ethical practices in the HTS, contextualized by the history of 
anthropology’s role in military and government operations, ethics standards and protocols in 
anthropology and the HTS, and the AAA’s public position against the HTS. In this thesis I 
sought to provide answers to the following research questions:  
1) Are there common themes to be found in discussions regarding the HTS in the 
government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres? 
2) Are there disparities in the ethics standards of AAA, human subjects research in 
academe, and the military? 
Context for these questions was established to better frame the controversy surrounding 
the employment of anthropologists (and other social scientists) in the military, and specifically 
the HTS. Both anthropology and the military are products of historical particularity and can only 
be understood in historical context. Information was thus collected on the US military, with an 
emphasis on the Army and the War on Terror given priority because the HTS officially began 
operating during this particular conflict. Further works on the roles of anthropology and the 
military in other wars were secured and analyzed as were scholarly publications on the history of 
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anthropology and colonial government relationships in order to understand anthropology’s long 
history with military and government intelligence. The Darkness in El Dorado ethics controversy 
for anthropology as a discipline was analyzed as a precursor to the AAA response to the 
emergence of the HTS. The initial creation of the HTS was also outlined. Establishing this 
historical context produced an understanding of anthropology’s engagement with governmental 
entities in the past as well as its own internal and public controversies over ethical practices.  
This context both framed and complimented the discourse analysis used to address the 
first research question: Are there common themes to be found in discussions regarding the HTS 
in the government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres? Through discourse 
analysis of selected government/military, anthropology, and general public materials on the HTS, 
five common themes were found across these discussions: uncertainty, vulnerability, social 
control, the coproduction of knowledge and data control. First, 134 significant works were 
located and those that dealt with ethics standards and practices where analyzed to provide an 
outline of information on standards and policies for ethics in anthropology the military and the 
AAA position on the HTS in order to address the second research question. For the first research 
question, these 134 works were narrowed down to 22 key items specifically for discourse 
analysis to identify common themes across the categories of military, academic and public 
discourse on the HTS.  
Uncertainty, vulnerability, and social control were found to be the three most prominent 
concerns regarding the HTS across government/military, anthropology, and general public 
spheres. Issues regarding the coproduction of knowledge and data control were found to be the 
next set of primary concerns. The identification of these five themes aided in addressing the 
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second research question: Are there disparities in the ethics standards of AAA, human subjects 
research in academe, and the military? The conclusive answer to this question is complex.  
Anthropology and the military do share a concern with ethical practices. Both have ethics 
guidelines and standards and both are bound in practice, to federal regulations, the DoD to 32 
CFR 219 and academic anthropologists to 45 CFR 46. While it is clear from the HTTHB and the 
HTS Social Science Directorate that ethics standards exist and that ethics training is critical to 
HTS, the process for review and approval of human subjects research proposals for HTTs by the 
equivalent of an IRB as required by 45 CFR 46 or 32 CFR 219 is not transparent. In contrast, for 
practicing anthropologists who are employed as academics, policies and processes for human 
subjects research review and oversight are very clear and available to the public via the websites 
for any academic institution’s HSPP unit.  
For the AAA and many anthropologists, this disparity produces uncertainty over policies 
and protocols for HSPP review to ensure, as much as is possible, that no harm is done in the 
process or as a result of HTS operations. This encompasses not only IRB review but informed 
consent and issues surrounding the used of data collected that could cause harm. Uncertainty 
exists about the rigor of training and the militarization of HTS social sciences and over the risk 
of violence and death for HTT members and indigenous civilian populations.  
To better understand this uncertainty and the complexity of the conflict over the HTS as 
well as identify potential ways to move forward with ideas for addressing those concerns, the 
themes addressing the first research question were applied to Hoffman’s (1999) model of cultural 
response to disaster in the context of the answers to the second research question. The use of this 
model allowed a conceptualization of the HTS and the ensuing controversy to be understood as a 
disaster-in-process and to identify common ground for recovery. Concern over social control was 
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identified as an element that “contributes to the complexity of recovery” from and working 
through issues of uncertainty and vulnerability as they presented in a crisis phase after the 
emergence of the HTS (Hoffman 1999:144). This was found to bear on how anthropology and 
the military might possibly engage in discourse on the HTS and address each others’ concerns in 
ways that consider the different goals of each institution in constructive dialog as a part of the 
passage to closure on this controversy. 
The Future of Debates and the HTS 
The AAA states that “among our goals are the dissemination of anthropological 
knowledge and its use to solve human problems” (2012). Given that the aim of HTS is to use 
local sociocultural knowledge for better operational decision-making and minimizing collateral 
damage, particularly indigenous civilian deaths, it would seem that the involvement of social 
scientists such as anthropologists in HTS meets AAA goals, the needs of national security, and 
reducing war casualties. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, “weaponizing culture” through 
the HTS is not supported by the AAA and is opposed by many anthropologists. 
So how might anthropologists work toward addressing the ethical issues evident in 
working with the HTS? I argue that moving forward in the passage to closure on the HTS 
requires anthropology to engage productively with the military on neutral ground rather than opt 
out of all engagement. Opting out is not a valid solution since war and other sociopolitical 
conflicts will continue, bringing with them ongoing potentials for harm to civilians and soldiers 
alike. If anthropology as a discipline were to completely disengage, a vacuum is created whereby 
other disciplines can dominate the military intelligence realm and pick up where anthropology 
left off, but perhaps in a less rigorously trained fashion in terms of ethnographic methods and 
cultural sensitivity. And if anthropologists do not cultivate a working relationship with the 
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military, what will stop the military creating their own “anthropologists” instead? What would 
this do for reducing uncertainty and vulnerability? 
As institutions with significantly different goals, anthropology and the military both 
“draw distinctions [between how they go] about research, data collection, advising, and 
intelligence, as well as differences between these activities” (AAA 2009a:25). However, both 
are, as noted above, grounded in professional ethics standards as well as have policies and 
regulations for ethical practice regarding the protection of human subjects. Anthropology and the 
military do need to engage in discourse on the HTS and address each others’ concerns in ways 
that consider the shared and different goals of each institution in constructive dialog as a part of 
the passage to closure on this controversy. 
The findings in this thesis suggest that a more substantial first step is for anthropology to 
find ways to work with the military to make human subjects protections policies, protocols, and 
practices in the HTS more transparent and accountable, reflecting the same ethical practice 
accountability that academic anthropologists are bound to through their institutions’ Human 
Subjects Protections Programs (HSPPs) and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). As it stands, a 
key concern is that data that is collected by social scientists in the HTS are not controlled by 
them or subject to transparent human subjects protection assurances and could thus be used for 
military decision-making that harms the populations involved. 
Several scholars have made recommendations for collaboration on these issues and that 
addresses the shared concerns over ethical practice as found in this thesis: uncertainty, 
vulnerability, social control, transparency. For example, George R Lucas, a military ethicist at 
the US Naval Academy, that anthropologists should “create a nongovernmental organization” 
like “Anthropologists Without Borders…that would advise the military but would not actually be 
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employed by the military” (Glenn 2009b:1). While Connable suggests that “the practice of 
deploying academics to a combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is 
trying to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally 
been suspicious of the U.S. military since the Viet Nam era” (2009:58), for anthropology to not 
work with the military is to fundamentally violate our own value of working to solve real world 
problems with our research. 
Additionally, more research needs to be done on the HTS. The HTS is now an established 
COIN entity and will continue to be used to achieve military and foreign policy objectives. The 
HTS is less than 10 years old and thus little real ethnographic work has been done on the 
program or with populations where the HTS has operated. Currently, research that has been 
conducted on the HTS primarily addresses concern for participants of ethnographic study and 
military agendas, both of which are important areas to scrutinize. This thesis is a contribution to 
this particular body of work. Further work with HTS social scientists and military personnel such 
as that by Nigh (2012) and found in the CEAUSSIC report (AAA 2009a) needs to be done as the 
HTS program expands. Future explorations could include fieldwork in HTS locations (i.e. 
headquarters in U.S., deployed HTS areas) to address current HTS experiences, what is and is 
not actually applied in the HTT fieldwork after training, and post-HTS ethical, physical, and, 
career risk assessments.  
In the future there will be more ex-HTS employees with firsthand experience who are 
able to freely write and speak about their experiences without this being “subject to review and 
approval by Army security and public affairs” (HTS 2014). This will provide opportunities for 
engagement in reflexive research on HTS. Even though the official HTS website claims that 
“HTS is not an applied anthropology program” (HTS 2014), a majority of ex-HTS employees 
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will be found coming from and returning to work in applied anthropology fields thus creating a 
new branch of research on the HTS and its relationship to applied work in the discipline. Yet 
even with future research, the solution to the controversy between anthropology and the military 
will remain very complex. I hope, however, that this fractious relationship can evolve into a 
mutually productive one. Beginning to navigate the ethical landscapes of anthropology and the 
military to find common ground, as I have done in this thesis, is just one step toward this as a 
possibility.  
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